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Abstract
The comfort zone model is widespread within adventure education literature. It is based on the belief that when placed in 
a stressful situation people will respond by overcoming their fear and therefore grow as individuals. This model is often 
presented to participants prior to activities with a highly perceived sense of risk and challenge which arouses strong emotional 
and physical responses to novel tasks (e.g., ropes courses or rock climbing activities). Students are encouraged to think about 
‘stretching themselves’ by moving outside their comfort zone, to expand their preconceived limits and by inference learn 
(and become better people). This paper explores theories from cognitive and social psychology, based on the work of Piaget 
and Festinger respectively, that underpin the comfort zone model. The perpetuation of this model which uses risk to promote 
situations of disequilibrium/dissonance does not find strong support in educational literature. It is therefore suggested that 
the comfort zone model be reframed as a metaphor, for possible discussion post activity, rather than being used as a model to 
underpin programming and pedagogy in adventure education settings.
Introduction
The comfort zone model or variants of it, is 
widespread within adventure education literature 
(e.g., Exeter, 2001; Luckner & Nadler, 1997; Prouty, 
Panicucci, & Collinson, 2007). It is based on the belief 
that when placed in a stressful or challenging situation 
people will respond, rise to the occasion and overcome 
their hesitancy or fear and grow as individuals. 
I have purposefully used the term adventure 
education in this paper to refer to the particular 
branch of outdoor education that has developed with 
a primary focus on developing interpersonal and 
intrapersonal relationships (Priest & Gass, 1997). The 
role of perceived risk is an integral component of the 
adventure education model (Leberman & Martin, 2003; 
Zink & Leberman, 2001). The pedagogical approach 
employed in adventure education is well summed up 
in the following quote,
To maximize safety, adventure 
professionals structure risk in a manner 
that causes participants to perceive it as 
being enormously high, while in actuality 
it is much lower than perceived and more 
acceptable as a medium for producing 
functional change and growth. By 
responding to seemingly insurmountable 
tasks, participants often learn to 
overcome self-imposed perceptions of 
their capabilities to succeed. (Priest & 
Gass, 1997, p. 17)
Within this model personal growth or 
transformation is dependent on the participant being 
placed in a stressful situation (Estrellas, 1996). This 
approach assumes that the ‘adventure professional’ is 
competent and capable of assessing each individual’s 
level of perceived risk to ensure that optimal learning 
will occur. 
The comfort zone is often presented graphically 
as shown in Figure 1. The basic premise of the comfort 
zone model is well stated by Luckner and Nadler 
(1997) who claim that, 
Through involvement in experiences 
that are beyond one’s comfort zone, 
individuals are forced to move into an area 
������ �� ������� ���� ������ ������� ���� ���������� ������
�������
����
��������������� ����
����� ����
Figure 1. Comfort zone model. Adapted from                    
    Pannicucci (2007)
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that feels uncomfortable and unfamiliar 
- the groan zone. By overcoming these 
anxious feelings and thoughts of self-
doubt while simultaneously sampling 
success, individuals move from the groan 
zone to the growth zone. (p. 20)
When being presented with the comfort zone 
model students are often asked, “What does it feel like 
when you are inside your comfort zone?”, “What does 
it feel like when you are outside your comfort zone?” 
and “What might prevent you from moving outside 
your comfort zone?” Student answers often include 
physiological responses (increased heart rate, sweating 
etc) as well as psychological reactions (feeling of panic, 
fear, excitement etc). Frontloading, emphasising the key 
learning points prior to the experience (Priest & Gass, 
1997), might include discussions about the desirability 
of learning as a life-long process, the factors that may 
have prevented the student from expanding his/her 
comfort zone in the past, and identifying reasons that 
were used for not trying new things. I have observed 
students writing excuses that they have used for not 
trying new things on a notepad and then ceremonially 
burning the piece of paper, writing positive statements 
on their arm before an activity which they subsequently 
read to provide inspiration if they doubted themselves, 
or providing their buddy with a key word or phrase to 
call out to encourage them.
Panicucci (2007) articulates some of the popular 
notions around the comfort zone model in the 
following quotations.
Some would argue that it is the proper 
use of stretch-zone experiences that is the 
catalyst in using adventure education to 
promote learning. (p. 38)
Experience has shown that learning 
occurs when people are in their stretch 
zone. Intellectual development and 
personal growth do not occur if there is 
no disequilibrium in a person’s current 
thinking or feeling. (p. 39)
How does the stretch zone work? It 
exposes students. Their usual defenses are 
taken away, and there is an opportunity 
to experience their inner being – to have 
wonderful ideas. People rarely take 
themselves to this place purposefully 
because it is uncomfortable, so it is a 
special growth opportunity when they 
are brought there during a carefully 
facilitated experience. (p. 41)
There are many potentially problematic issues 
and unsubstantiated assumptions presented here. For 
example the proposition that ‘exposing’ students is 
positive, that somehow by stripping away defences 
one reveals an “inner being,” that an “inner being” 
is somehow a stable and true reflection of one’s self. 
How acceptable is it for an instructor with no clinical 
training to encourage a student with a history of 
depression to take risks given that the outcome of 
participation is uncertain? Does the associated anxiety 
and potential for failure reinforce existing beliefs 
and compound a pre-existing or otherwise latent 
condition? These questions become increasingly salient 
when one considers Davis-Berman and Berman’s 
(2002) finding that outdoor leaders often receive little 
or no instruction in assessing emotional risk and 
“any discussion of anxiety – a central component to 
emotional risk – is non-existent” (p. 308). Zink and 
Leberman (2001) drawing on Estrellas (1996), point 
out,  “the manipulation of risk can be dysfunctional 
when the risk is to [sic] great, as this can cause high 
levels of stress, which in turn may impact negatively 
on individuals and groups” (p. 52). Davis-Berman 
and Berman (2002) have also suggested that, “by 
intentionally heightening the perception of risk in 
outdoor programs, staff may be pushing participants 
beyond their ability to cope effectively and may 
be creating unacceptably high levels of anxiety in 
participants” (p. 30).
It is also interesting to observe students’ talk 
following the introduction of this model. It often 
appears that reference to being ‘outside of one’s 
comfort zone’ becomes the measure of success in 
other aspects of the programme. As Long (2001) has 
pointed out, participants in adventure activities can be 
socialised into commonly shared understandings of 
what an activity is ‘about.’ Individual meaning making 
is partially determined by the discourse(s) that frame 
an activity. What is spoken of may underpin ensuing 
discussions but equally what is ‘unspoken’ during 
framing an activity may exclude future interpretations 
of experiences. If discussion prior to an activity focuses 
on the concept of ‘stretching one’s comfort zone’ it 
is highly probable that being ‘in’ or ‘out’ of one’s 
comfort zone, becomes by default a measure of the 
‘effectiveness’ of an activity for learning. By inference, 
if you are in your comfort zone you are not learning, 
if you are out of your comfort zone you are learning. 
Such binary assumptions are worth unpacking and 
examining if we are serious about understanding 
the conditions for optimal learning. In this paper I 
examine aspects of Piagetian cognitive development 
and Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance which 
underpin the comfort zone model. In doing so, I 
problematise some of the underlying assumptions 
from an educational perspective and suggest that in 
light of other, more positive approaches to encouraging 
change, that this model be repositioned as a metaphor 
to aid student understanding of learning rather than 
as the underlying principle of programme design.
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What is a comfort zone?
The term ‘comfort zone’ is not only readily 
referred to in the literature but it is also 
prevalent in the discourse of adventure 
education practitioners. But what is a 
comfort zone? How do you know if 
it is growing? Is there one ‘universal’ 
comfort zone that defines or limits my 
behaviour across all activities or are 
comfort zones task/context specific? Do 
my actions indicate that my comfort zone 
has increased or am I merely performing 
to complete the task so I can ‘get out of 
here’? Can my comfort zone shrink?
So what does the research on the comfort zone 
model have to contribute? In two words: very little. 
This influential component of adventure education 
theory, in regards to teaching and learning, appears to 
be built on a rather small base. There does not appear 
to be a ‘comfort zone theory’ per se. Searches in main 
educational and psychological journal databases 
make no reference to the ‘comfort zone’ as a theory or 
model. The term appears as a metaphor in the title in 
a number of publications (for example, see Eccelstone, 
2004) but it does not appear as an educational 
theory, as for example, experiential learning does. 
The restricted base on which some components of 
adventure education practice have been built has also 
been commented on by Wolfe and Samdahl (2005). In 
a study which examined ropes course programming, 
as an example of adventure education, they suggested 
that the pedagogy utilised is based on two central 
assumptions: that risk and challenge lead to positive 
outcomes; and that these benefits are transferable 
to experiences other than the challenge course. They 
argued that these assumptions have been accepted as 
foundational tenets for programming without having 
been tested as to their veracity.
It appears that the comfort zone model, 
popularised in adventure education literature, 
primarily finds its roots in the psychological fields 
of cognitive development (Piaget, 1977, 1980) and 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). In regard to the 
terms disequilibrium, cognitive conflict and cognitive 
dissonance there is, as Fraser (1998) notes, little 
consistent use of the terms in much of the literature 
and at times they are used interchangeably. I have 
tried, where possible, to use the terms as consistently 
as possible when referring to the original writings 
relating to these concepts.
While it is clear that Piaget’s (1977, 1980) concept 
of the role of cognitive conflict or disequilibrium 
has been considered important in mainstream 
instructional strategies involving conceptual change, 
the epistemology of constructivist learning theory, and 
child cognitive development, it has also influenced 
‘traditional’ approaches to adventure education 
theory and practice. It appears that adventure 
education theorists and practitioners may not have 
adequately grasped the nuances and the theoretical 
and hypothetical components of developmental 
psychology and the limitations of cognitive dissonance. 
This has resulted in the uncritical and unquestioned 
acceptance of theories and associated principles which 
are possibly utilised in an inappropriate or ‘blanket’ 
manner. The intention of this paper is not to dismiss 
Piaget’s or Festinger’s theories, rather it is to raise some 
concerns which have a bearing on their applicability in 
an adventure education context. 
A brief introduction to Piaget’s theory of 
cognitive development
Piaget was interested in describing processes of 
cognitive development, and the nature of intelligence, 
“in this sense he was as much an epistemological 
philosopher as a psychologist” (Kolb, 1984,  p. 12). His 
background was in science and the concepts which 
form the basis of his theory of cognitive development 
in children drew heavily on the language and 
terminology of biology. Piaget is possibly best know 
for identifying appropriate developmental stages in 
a child’s cognitive development, an approach often 
referred to as genetic epistemology. His core concern 
was describing the cognitive development of children 
from birth to late adolescence.
Piaget compared the process by which 
children construct understanding of 
their world to that used by natural 
organisms adapting to changes in their 
environment. He maintained that the 
growth of intelligence is regulated by 
the same processes that determine the 
growth of morphology and changes in 
the physiology of all living systems. 
(McInerney & McInerney, 1998, p. 21)
According to Piaget (1977, 1980) as children grow 
they move from a position of having relatively few 
cognitive structures to interpret the external world of 
experiences to a more sophisticated stage where they 
develop the ability to internally organise their own 
cognitive structures. Just as organisms adapt to the 
environment to maintain biological balance through 
the processes of accommodation and assimilation 
so too do children as they develop their cognitive 
structures. Piaget was interested in describing the 
circumstances under which the child develops from 
one structure to the next. 
Assimilation, accommodation and equilibration
When a new experience is encountered that is 
similar to previous experiences the child may engage 
in the process of assimilation. Assimilation involves 
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the integration of new experiences into existing 
cognitive structure which are adequate to incorporate 
the requirements of the new task (e.g., new experience 
of drinking juice from a teat rather than milk) 
(McInerney & McInerney, 1998). If the new experience 
is sufficiently different (e.g., drinking from a cup rather 
than a teat) then the child will engage in the process 
of accommodation. Accommodation involves the 
modification of the existing structure to incorporate 
the new experience (McInerney & McInerney, 1998). 
The presentation of a novel task in an adventure 
education setting may create a tension between what 
is currently known, or practiced, and the new and 
unique demands of the task. This tension between the 
demands of accommodation and assimilation is the 
driving force to develop new understandings and a 
new equilibrium (McInerney & McInerney, 1998). In an 
ideal educational setting every experience a learner has 
would involve both the requirements for assimilation 
and accommodation. However, if an experience
is so far from an organism’s cognitive 
structure that it cannot be accommodated, 
no learning will take place. For optimal 
learning to take place, information must 
be presented that can be assimilated 
into present cognitive structures, but at 
the same time, be different enough to 
necessitate a change in those structures. 
If the information cannot be assimilated, 
it simply cannot be understood. 
(Hergenhahn, 1982, p. 290)
The structures (or in Piaget’s terminology 
‘schema’) currently available to a child enables 
particular thought processes or certain actions to 
be performed. In other words, how much of the 
environment a child can understand or even respond to 
depends on the structures available to it at its present 
stage of development (e.g., if a child has only grasping 
or sucking available to them then this is what they will 
do). According to Piagetian theory a child moves from 
responding to physical stimulus in the environment 
(concrete operations) to complex and more abstract 
problem solving tasks (formal operations) based on 
cognitive structures that have been established on 
earlier experiences.
Piaget proposed four cognitive stages in a child’s 
development; sensori-motor (0-2 years), preoperational 
(2-7 years), concrete operational (7-12 years), and 
formal operational (12 years +). For Piaget the driving 
force that impels the child to either assimilate new 
facts into existing structures or to modify existing 
knowledge to include new facts (accommodation) is 
the desire to maintain equilibration. “Piaget assumed 
that all organisms have an innate tendency to create a 
harmonious relationship between themselves and their 
environment.... Equilibration is this innate tendency 
to organize one’s experiences so as to assure maximal 
adaptation” (Hergenhahn, 1982, p. 285).
Applicability of Piaget’s theory and some 
critiques
Piaget’s theory has both critics and defenders 
(Egan, 2002; Lourenco & Machado, 1996). Some of 
the critiques have focussed on the categorisation of 
what is deemed to be developmental appropriate 
within certain stages, whilst others (see Egan, 2002) 
have mounted a strong argument critiquing the very 
foundations of Piaget’s approach. For example, the 
assertion that one always seeks equilibrium when faced 
with new knowledge which requires either assimilation 
or accommodation appears to be an assumption or 
hypothesis which is difficult to substantiate. The 
proposition of equilibrium as a necessary condition 
is of a conceptual nature rather than a ‘fact’ that can 
be substantiated by empirical studies. Without getting 
into an extended debate about the merits of a post-
formal stage or stages it is apparent that the notion of 
equilibrium is a contested and controversial issue.  It 
has been suggested that there is a post-formal stage of 
development, a stage proposed beyond Piaget’s formal 
thinking stage (variously occurring between 11-15 years 
of age). Advocates of a post-formal stage argue that 
this additional stage, or in some proponents theories, 
stages, allows us to account for cognitive development 
after adolescence. For example, Riegel (1975) suggests 
that the ‘dialectical stage,’ is characterized by the fact 
that the individual is “able to accept contradictions 
as the basis of all thought and to tolerate conflicting 
operations without equilibriating them under all 
circumstances (p.61)” (cited in Lourenco & Machado, 
1996, p. 155).
Kramer (1983) argues that a “post-formal stage 
allows us to handle the relativistic nature of knowledge, 
the acceptance of contradiction, and the integration 
of contradiction into an overriding whole” (cited in 
Lourenco & Machado, 1996, p. 155). Regardless of 
which stage we attribute post adolescent development 
to it is apparent that people are able to accept the 
relativistic nature of knowledge and the acceptance of 
contradiction (Lourenco & Machado, 1996).
Another criticism of Piaget’s theory 
says, in its mild version, that the theory 
provides vague explanations of cognitive 
development, and in its strong version, 
that the theory describes much but 
explains little ... equilibration, considered 
by Piaget the most fundamental principle 
of cognitive development, is a metaphor at 
best (Ferreira da Silva, 1982), a superfluous 
concept at worst (Bruner, 1959; Zazzo, 
1962). (Lourenco & Machado, 1996, p. 
152)
7Australian  Journal of Outdoor Education, 12(1), 3-12, 2008 
The concepts of accommodation, assimilation 
and equilibrium are but one way to account for an 
individual’s process of learning. As Halford (1989) 
points out even within cognitive psychology there 
are competing theories of cognitive development and 
Zohar and Aharon-Kravetsky (2005) argue that whilst 
the promotion of cognitive conflict is a significant 
instructional method there is still inconclusive 
evidence regarding the effectiveness of this strategy. 
Keeping abreast of current debates and critiques 
of underlying theories is of importance to adventure 
educators if we are to ensure that the practices which 
we utilise have solid foundations.  
Application of Piaget’s theory to adventure 
education
Care should be taken not to interpret Piaget’s 
theory as if it were a stimulus-response relationship; 
creating disequilibrium through stress = learning.  A 
stimulus-response approach assumes that a person is 
a passive recipient who develops response capabilities 
by accumulating habits. In contrast, Piaget’s theory 
posits that the cognitive structures that a child has 
developed from experiences provide the potential 
to deal with the environment in certain ways, that 
is, they provide the interpretive framework to 
understand further experiences (Hergenhahn, 1982). 
Previous experiences and the cognitive structures 
available permit the child to construct meaning, as 
needed from new experiences. What is assimilated 
or accommodated depends on the child’s needs/
desires. If the experiences that are provided are too 
novel and too far from a person’s normal activities 
and experiences it is possible that rather than being 
accommodated they will be dismissed as irrelevant 
or impossible. As Hergenhahn (1982) cautions, “If 
something is so far from an organism’s cognitive 
structure that it cannot be accommodated, no learning 
will take place” (p. 290).
Difficulties arise when one confuses providing 
a stimulus and observing a response which is then 
equated with learning. For example, as Brookes 
(2003a) has pointed out, providing students with 
a challenge on the ropes course will elicit a range of 
relatively predictable behaviours in students (fear, 
anxiety, perseverance, a ‘buzz’ etc.). He refers to 
this as ‘conformist effects.’ He also cautions against 
confusing conformity effects, which are temporary, 
with educational change. I argue that some adventure 
education practices (e.g., using the perception of risk 
to create ‘conflict’ between one’s thoughts of possible 
physical harm and the reality of the situation) actually 
encourage and elicit conformity in behaviours which, 
if not recognised and critiqued, are normalised by 
adventure educators who use certain activities to 
evoke a predictable response. This, I suggest, is not 
how Piaget’s theory of cognitive development should 
be implemented. Piaget was not particularly interested 
in the pedagogical implications of his observations. 
Using stressful situations in adventure education 
illustrates the power of direct experiences in eliciting 
context specific behaviours. However, as Brookes 
(2003a, 2003b; 2003c) suggests, behaviour in an 
adventure education context may be a poor predictor 
of behaviour in non-adventure education specific 
contexts. The placing of a student in a challenging 
position which elicits a particular behaviour does not 
necessarily mean that they are learning. 
Insights from cognitive dissonance
Coming from social psychology, the theory of 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) is concerned with 
how a person deals with inconsistency between their 
cognitions. Cognitions refer to elements of knowledge 
that people have about their beliefs, actions and their 
environment. In adventure education, attempts to 
create a state of dissonance between participants’ 
beliefs and actions are evidenced through the use of 
novel tasks or activities, often with a perception of 
difficulty or risk. Cognitions can be: (i) unrelated 
or irrelevant, having no bearing on each other; (ii) 
consonant, related and in agreement or; (iii) dissonant, 
related and contradictory. Cognitive dissonance theory 
is premised on the belief that people will interpret an 
event or experience to maintain consistency between 
their beliefs, actions and behaviours. The motivation 
to,
reduce dissonance is directly proportional 
to the magnitude and importance of the 
discrepant cognitions, and inversely 
proportional to the magnitude and 
importance of the consistent cognitions. 
This tension is typically reduced by 
changing one of the cognitions, or adding 
new cognitions until mental ‘consonance’ 
is achieved. (Cooper & Carlsmith, 2001, 
p. 2112)
While it is accepted that attitudes can effect 
behaviour, cognitive dissonance theory explains how 
the reverse is also true – under certain conditions your 
behaviour can lead to a change in your attitude. When 
faced with a situation where there is a conflict between 
their beliefs and their actions people may reduce their 
dissonance “by changing one of their cognitions, or 
by adding new cognitions until mental ‘consonance 
is achieved” (Cooper & Carlsmith, 2001, p. 2112). 
Examples of strategies that an individual might employ 
include: a) retrospectively justifying that the effort was 
worth the result; for example, spending years gaining 
a PhD is an achievement which I value, if this were not 
the case I would have cognitive dissonance-why did I 
bother?; b) appealing to the effect of forced or induced 
compliance. If, for example, a smoker is asked to give 
a speech on the merits of non-smoking, is it likely 
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that he/she will change his/her view of smoking? 
According to cognitive dissonance theory it would 
depend on why he/she agreed to give the speech in 
the first place. If they had been offered a large sum 
of money it is highly likely that there would be no 
change in attitude. The payment was sufficiently large 
to justify giving the speech, “I did it for the money.” 
If on the other hand they did it for nothing, or for a 
small sum of money, then it is more likely that his/her 
attitude to smoking may have changed. The reason, 
posited by cognitive dissonance theory, is that there is 
no adequate external justification for giving the speech 
and therefore to reduce the dissonance the smoker 
provides a ‘logical’ explanation – the views expressed 
in the speech were those that he/she believed. 
The two explanations offered above, justification 
of effort and forced compliance, are ways of explaining 
the logical inconsistencies that a person might come 
across.  “The question is whether all cases of dissonance 
reduction boil down to an analogous tendency to keep 
cognitions logically consistent. A number of authors 
believe that some non-cognitive, emotional factors 
often also play a role” (Gleitman, 1986, p. 375). The 
suggestion that resolution of dissonance might not 
be attributable to purely logical inconsistencies gave 
rise to the introduction of self-perception theories by 
way of explanation. According to Aronson’s (1968) 
hypothesis, dissonance is a significant motivational 
factor in the maintenance of positive self-concept, that 
is, maintaining a favourable picture of ourselves. In 
this view dissonance occurred when a person’s belief 
that he/she was a good person was placed in doubt by 
behaviour that undermined this belief. In the previous 
two examples we can see how this hypothesis might 
function. I have a PhD which satisfies my desire to 
have a favourable self-picture. Likewise, our smoker 
who has received no financial gain to justify his/her 
anti-smoking speech, may change his/her attitude to 
maintain his/her self-image as a moral person who 
seeks to do the right thing. If he/she wants to persuade 
others of the benefits of non-smoking, he/she is 
required to modify his/her own views to appease his/
her conscience. 
Aronson predicted that dissonance 
arousal would be more frequent and more 
powerful among those with high self-
esteem – that is, among those whose past 
history had led them to believe that their 
high internal standards of behaviour were 
likely to be achieved. By contrast, Aronson 
predicted that those with low self esteem, 
who were accustomed to behaving less 
competently, would not be surprised or 
discomforted to find themselves once 
again behaving in an incompetent manner. 
(Cooper & Carlsmith, 2001, p. 2113)
It appears that people with high self-esteem are 
likely to be both more susceptible to arousal induced 
by dissonance, but also more resistant to its effects as 
they can focus on their strengths which mitigates the 
need to reduce the dissonance (Cooper & Carlsmith, 
2001).
In a further revision of the theory, Cooper 
and Fazio (1984) postulated that dissonance occurs 
when a person believes that “their behaviour has 
been responsible for bringing about consequences 
that are unwanted or aversive. If there are no such 
consequences, then inconsistent behaviour will not 
produce the state of dissonance” (Cooper & Carlsmith, 
2001, p. 2114). Cooper and Fazio (1984) argue that if 
a person believes that they have responsibility of an 
aversive event then this is the more likely cause of 
the ensuing cognitive dissonance than a cognitive 
inconsistency. More recently, Cooper (1999) has 
suggested that dissonance is “caused by a discrepancy 
between the outcome of a behavioural act and the 
standard to which it is compared” (cited in Cooper 
& Carlsmith, 2001, p. 2114). Sometimes this standard 
will be personal and at other times it might be judged 
against broader cultural norms.
The immediately aforementioned revisions of 
Festinger’s original theory feature an emphasis on 
self-concept and cultural norms as the driving force 
for resolving inconsistencies in cognitions about 
behaviour, attitudes and the environment rather than 
appealing to the need to maintain logical consistency 
between conflicting conceptual propositions. Whilst 
Festinger’s original theory of cognitive dissonance has 
undergone a number of revisions what the theory does 
do, in its different forms, is provide a framework for 
thinking about the possible motivations for change 
when people are faced with inconsistencies between 
thoughts and actions.  What is clear is that there 
appear to be various ‘triggers’ for creating dissonant 
conditions and these triggers are, like people, different 
and certainly not uniform and predictable. 
Cognitive dissonance/disequilibrium and 
learning
Cognitive dissonance or disequilibrium has been 
applied in the classroom context through a variety 
of strategies to effect conceptual change. Strategies 
to foster conceptual change are based on creating an 
element of disequilibrium or discord within the learner 
between their initial conception and the principle to 
be taught; i.e., an existing understanding of events/
rationale can potentially be changed by presentation 
of a more appropriate scientific explanation. However, 
disequilibrium between discrepant events may lead to 
a change in conceptual understandings, or it may not! 
There has been considerable research which supports 
both the negative and positive effects of the use of 
cognitive conflict as a teaching strategy. For example, 
9Australian  Journal of Outdoor Education, 12(1), 3-12, 2008 
Zohar and Aharon-Kravetsky (2005) argue that for low 
achieving students the use of cognitive conflict as a 
teaching strategy can actually hinder their progress in 
class. 
It appears that not only do students of various 
abilities respond differently to the use of dissonance 
but also that the degree of dissonance has differing 
effects, some discrepant events can be powerful in 
stimulating conceptual change while others have no 
effect at all. Major disequilibrium can have two effects: 
a restructuring of conceptual understanding; or the 
rejection of anomalous data (Rea-Ramirez & Clement, 
1998). It was found that rather than giving up their 
previous conceptions to accommodate the new 
information students in science classes were likely to 
either reject the new information or classify it as only 
appropriate to ‘school’ settings which is not valid in 
the ‘real world’ (Rea-Ramirez & Clement, 1998). Driver, 
Guesne and Tiberghien (1985) have commented that 
the restructuring of concepts takes time and favourable 
circumstances, not just the observation of a discrepant 
event. 
It may be that disequilibrium is to some extent 
unavoidable, and beneficial for some students on 
some occasions. However, the premise that the active 
promotion of disequilibrium is necessary to promote 
learning is contestable. A situation which engenders 
disequilibrium may be treated by learners as too great 
a ‘leap’ in understanding and meaning in which case 
they might reject it outright or otherwise consign it 
to the ‘not valid in the real world’ file. Students may 
ignore the experience, attribute it to luck, the efforts/
support of others, or accept only sufficient aspects of 
the experience to make peripheral changes in their 
prior conceptions. For example, does the student 
view ‘success’ on the rock face as being related to 
success in other aspects of life? It may well be that the 
cognition created, “I can achieve” is seen as unrelated 
to ‘achievement’ in other settings, and therefore, 
no dissonance has arisen for the individual. If the 
individual does not place much weight on the value 
of the cognitions, they believe them to be trivial and 
of little importance, then little dissonance is likely to 
occur. The occurrence of one dissonant cognition, 
“I can achieve success on the ropes course” does not 
mean that this single event will replace other multiple 
cognitions regarding the individual’s ability in other 
settings requiring physical skill or application of 
perseverance. The level of dissonance is also inversely 
proportional to the number of cognitions that support 
a particular belief of ability; years of socialisation and 
behavioural expectations are unlikely to be replaced 
by a single event, particularly when it is experienced 
in a novel or highly contrived environment.
Whilst Rea-Ramirez and Clement’s (1998) 
work focussed on studying conceptual change 
through the use of dissonance in science education 
it is useful in that it casts light on students’ ability to 
compartmentalise new knowledge as being valid only 
in particular contexts (at school and therefore not ‘real’) 
in order to prevent a conflict of ideas from arising. 
There is no reason to suspect that ‘in the outdoors’ 
and ‘real life’ are not seen as separate contexts where 
different ideas/standards apply. Students’ ability 
to  ‘compartmentalise’ is supported by Wattchow 
and Johnson’s (2004) findings in relation to students’ 
perspectives of environmental issues following a 
long stay outdoor education experience. The research 
revealed how students considered the bush and the city 
as totally unrelated and therefore they had no desire 
or interest in becoming involved in environmental 
projects upon returning to their homes in an urban 
setting. They had in effect differentiated knowledge 
into ‘outdoor’ and ‘real world’ compartments which 
were seen as disconnected, thus avoiding dissonant 
cognitions.
The contradictory and inconclusive findings 
certainly do not give a clear and unambiguous mandate 
for creating situations which engender dissonance or 
disequilibrium as an effective learning strategy for 
all students. Simply placing a person in a potentially 
stressful situation does not guarantee a state of 
cognitive dissonance. Even if discrepant events occur 
people will invariably have a number of different ways 
of rejecting or reconciling these apparently dissonant 
cognitions. Even if we assume that being ‘outside of 
one’s comfort zone’ equates to experiencing cognitive 
dissonance we are still not able to equate this state 
with learning. As Fraser (1998) states, “it cannot be 
claimed that conflict through disequilibrium is always 
a catalyst for cognitive development” (p. 46). 
Where to from here?
Arguably, Piaget’s greatest contribution is not 
the often cited structuralist approach identified in the 
four developmental stages, but rather his promotion 
of constructivism, the principle that learners construct 
their own understandings through interaction with 
the world. Constructivism, itself the subject of critique 
(Egan, 2002), is not premised on the need to place 
students in a position ‘outside their comfort zone’ 
in order to learn. One of the tenets of constructivist 
approaches to learning is that students start with 
the concrete world with which they are familiar. As 
detailed above, simply placing people in stressful 
situations which places them outside their ‘comfort 
zone’ does not necessarily lead to learning.
To re-iterate the central issues:
i) Piaget was interested in describing the process 
of cognitive development not enunciating a pedagogy 
for adventure education;
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ii) The processes of assimilation, accommodation 
and equilibrium are hypothetical constructs that not 
amenable to empirical testing (nor for that matter 
capable of being disproved);
iii) It is possible that people are able to hold 
‘contrary views’ in the post-formal stage of cognitive 
development, therefore the desire to maintain 
equilibrium is not a necessity;
iv) How one might learn does not necessarily 
mean that you should construct lessons on that basis. 
For example, we know that touching a hot plate is 
painful and results in a burn. From a behaviourist 
perspective we have a strong observable stimulus-
response pattern evident: touch-pain; therefore don’t 
touch. Does that mean that the most effective way to 
teach children that an element is hot is to place their 
hand on it?;
v) Students have the ability to compartmentalise 
concepts as belonging to ‘other than the real world.’ 
hence avoiding dissonant situations;
vi) Some discrepant events lead to change, some 
do not. Research indicates both the positive and 
negative effects of using cognitive conflict as a teaching 
strategy;
vii) Ascertaining individuals response to stress, 
anxiety, conditions of cognitive dissonance is a difficult 
task. 
Perhaps it is timely to re-emphasize the social 
factors in development and avoid a ‘black box’ 
approach where learning is conceived of something 
that goes on inside one’s head in a social vacuum.  As 
Bandura (1986) states, 
Cognitive learning is fostered through 
tuition, modelling, and performance 
feedback, rather than confined to the 
influence of mismatching experiences of 
unguided action. Most of the cognitive 
skills and structures used in daily 
pursuits are cultivated socially, rather 
than transform themselves asocially. (p. 
483) 
Conclusion
  Adventure educators have taken the 
concepts of dissonance/disequilibrium and applied 
them in a rather functionalist or stimulus-response 
manner. Accommodation-assimilation-equilibrium 
are conceptual descriptions of a child’s cognitive 
development processes (note they are descriptive not 
explanatory). To take this concept and apply it as a 
teaching strategy is a simplistic reading of a descriptive 
concept. As Boud and Walker (1993) remind us “learning 
from experience is far more indirect than we often 
pretend it to be” (p. 85). Using a description of how we 
learn, modifying it to promote ‘stressful situations,’ and 
applying it as an instructional strategy has given rise to 
a teaching and learning approach which, I suggest, has 
placed adventure education on an educational limb; a 
limb that finds us struggling to gain credibility within 
the mainstream educational discourse. In relative 
isolation we tend to draw on some foundational texts 
that have not been critically examined, are repeatedly 
referenced, and through which the field continues to 
perpetuate taken-for-granted assumptions as defining 
principles of adventure education theory and practice. 
The centrality of the concepts of challenge and risk 
to the field are examples of how a discourse has been 
built up around an approach to adventure education 
that finds its basis in the notion that personal growth 
and learning primarily occur when an individual 
is placed in a situation outside their ‘comfort zone.’ 
However, as Leberman and Martin (2003) have 
pointed out, activities in which students had been 
pushed outside of their ‘comfort zones’ were not 
necessarily the activities that resulted in peak learning 
experiences. I suggest that the adoption of the comfort 
zone model and the assumptions that underpin it have 
less than desirable consequences in terms of student 
engagement, psychological well-being and emotional 
safety. As educators we hear the success stories 
and vocal affirmations but what of the silences and 
unspoken thoughts that are subsumed in the rush for 
appropriate closure of an activity? 
I am not advocating that we abandon challenging 
and adventurous activities with our students: far from 
it. Opportunities for ‘authentic risk taking’ where 
fabricated stress is minimised, where there is dialogue 
about risk and genuine personal choice fosters “an 
environment which encourages appropriate risk 
taking” (Estrellas, 1996,  p. 34) and the potential for 
positive learning outcomes.  What I am cautioning 
against is the use of the comfort zone as a model for 
learning that is used an as explanation for how we 
learn and therefore the justification for intentionally 
engineering or ‘cooking up’ situations to place students 
outside their ‘comfort zone.’
Stress is a consistent element of 
wilderness adventures, just as it is a 
consistent part of life. However, stress 
should not be manipulated further in 
the guise of facilitating transformative 
experiences. Stress is known to cause 
physiological and psychological damage. 
To purposefully create stressful situations 
as a companion to risk taking blatantly 
fosters an environment of negative 
outcomes. (Estrellas, 1996, p. 42)
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Creating a perception of risk and challenging 
people to move outside their ‘comfort zone’ is seen 
as an integral feature for growth and change in 
participants of ‘traditional approaches’ to adventure 
education programmes. Using stress as the way to 
achieve growth may possibly have taken on the mantle 
of an ‘urban myth’ in education in the outdoors.  Recent 
research (Berman & Davis-Berman, 2005; Davis-Berman 
& Berman, 2002; Estrellas, 1996; Leberman & Martin, 
2003; Zink & Leberman, 2003), and the central tenet of 
this paper is that it is perhaps time to advocate for a 
paradigm shift in the way leaders frame and conduct 
adventure education programmes. Davis-Berman and 
Berman (2002) have argued that the greatest amount of 
change comes when participants feel safe, secure and 
accepted. They have argued that, 
more productive avenues to growth and 
change exist, based on participants’ safety 
and security. The paradigm shift suggested 
... reflects a movement toward a more 
intrinsic model of motivation to change. 
This model is based on emotional safety 
and stability in programs, rather than an 
emphasis on increasing risk and moving 
out of comfort zones. (Davis-Berman & 
Berman, 2002, p. 310)
Effective learning depends on solid foundations 
and strong relationships of trust and support between 
educator and learner and between learners (Vella, 
2002). For example, the concepts of reciprocal learning 
and autonomy/self-determination (Bishop & Glynn, 
1999) create new metaphors for teaching and learning 
and reframe the relationship between educators and 
learners. Learning can be viewed as a gradual and 
cumulative process rather than a sudden quantum 
shift in understanding. Learning can and will occur 
in activities that do not create a strong perception 
of risk (Leberman & Martin, 2003). Let us provide 
students with favourable conditions for authentic and 
meaningful experiences where they are challenged 
in an appropriate manner and suitably supported by 
those with a genuine interest in their learning informed 
by sound educational principles. It is time to reposition 
the comfort zone model as metaphor; a metaphor 
to describe how we might think about learning and 
growth rather than a rationale for implementing 
dubious teaching and learning practices.
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